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Monetarism is a protean concept. While intended to
be universally applicable to all capitalist market
economies, the specific forms of its theoretical constructs
and the content of its policy sets have varied over time
and between countries. The currently dominant brand
associated with Milton Friedman and the post-World
War II Chicago School, differs in a number of theoretical
respects from the -1930s Chicago School of Monetarism
Ascheim and Tavlas 1979:167-831. American
monetarists rationalise the failure of Mrs Thatcher's
monetarist strategy for Britain as correct policy poorly
executed. Until the roof caved in in 1980-81 on the
monetarist strategy of Martinez de Hoz, Argentine
monetarists confidently attributed the earlier demise
of Brazilian monetarism to opportunistic backsliding.
Martinez de Hoz remained relatively steadfast to the
end, hence Chilean monetarists attribute that dismal
end to timing errors, to his trying to squeeze domestic
liquidity and dismantle the public sector and import
controls gradually rather than by shock treatment',
Chilean style. At the time of writing 1September 19811
Chilean monetarism is probably entering its crisis.
Would this be the ultimate test that will corner Latin
American monetarism and force eschatological mea
culpas from its dying lips? Not likely. Too much
ideology underlies the addiction to monetarism for
that.
Like most big theories in the social sciences, monetarism
is an uneasy blend of positive theorising and ideological
predilections. The flexibility of monetarism reflects
reinterpretations of some of its basic theoretical tenets
to account for failures in application and for changing
institutional circumstances. The reluctance to scrap
the tenets is mainly grounded in the ideological
predilections.
The basic accounting identity of monetarism, MVE PT,
enables one summarily to identify its core tenets.
These are:
M, the money supply. is a measurable entity of
relatively stable composition through time.
The aggregate demand for M is a stable measurable
function, primarily of income and of expectations
about the future price level.
Variations of V (velocity) are therefore minor
when the households and businesses of the economy
agree with confidence on the future rate of change
of the price level.
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The private sector is inherently stable. That is,
the self-correcting power of competitive market
forces if allowed to operate freely tends to sustain
full employment of labour and productive capacity,
so that short-term oscillations of T (an index of
aggregate output) are narrowly bounded, while the
long-term trend of T is determined by the growth of
the supply of labour and the technological and
capital accumulating factors governing its productivity.
Since T is a changing aggregate of goods, this means
to monetarists that the trend of T is a continuum of
Walrasian equilibria.
The supply of M can be controlled with reasonable
precision by the monetary authorities, so that by
targeting on an appropriate growth of M, the
authorities can control the price level, P, and the
rate of inflation.
Stable growth of M ensures that price expectations
will also be stable and that economic growth will be
relatively smooth.
Milton Friedman, ath'isor to Mrs Thatcher and
Chiles Chicago Boys.
Differences among monetarists, which account for
the protean aspects of the beast, have centred on the
first three tenets. There is disagreement on what
liquid assets should be included in M, how the demand
for money function should be specified, how price
expectations are formed, etc. Tenets 4 to 6, on the
other hand, are ideological fixed points, ie, unassailable
axioms of faith, rather than testable and potentially
rejectable propositions.
We dub them axioms of faith for two basic reasons.
The first is that the actual history of both the advanced
and the less-developed capitalist economies has been
one of cyclically unstable growth, with associated
fluctuations in their rates of unemployment and excess
capacity. Monetarists explain these fluctuations by ad
hoc causal stories of varying plausibility that invariably
assign primal responsibility to mismanagement by the
monetary authorities, market interferences by the
fiscal authorities, or some combination of the two.
That is, their empirics are designed to beg rather than
answer the question: are tenets 4 to 6 valid? Second,
they assume rather than try to prove theoretically that
the normal growth path of a competitive market
economy with money, debt and capital accumulation,
is a continuum of Walrasian general equilibria. They
simply ignore the fact that those theorists who have
been rigorously exploring the necessary and sufficient
conditions for stability of such Walrasian systems
have been quite unable to show that non-inflationary
full employment growth is one of the general properties
Hahn 1980:1-171.
There is, nevertheless, a major difference of emphasis
between monetarist analysis of the stagflation problems
of the advanced capitalist economies and of the Latin
American economies. In the former it is assumed that
private commodity and financial markets are already
adequately competitive so that the solution to stagflation
is mainly to correct flaws in macro monetary and fiscal
policy, with perhaps a transitory depression to bring
wages in union-ridden labour markets in line. In the
latter, particularly in the semi-industrialised Latin
American countries, monetarists have assumed that
the private markets had been badly distorted by the
prior mercantilist. labour and social welfare measures
used to induce industrial investment and evoke popular
backing for the industrialisation effort. Their corrective
policy packet has therefore been much more
revolutionary, or rather counter-revolutionary. In
addition to curbing the growth of M and the fiscal
deficit, it includes a wide-ranging set of reforms designed
to liberalise commodity and financial markets in order
to 'get prices right.
Getting prices right' to its advocates means allowing
supply and demand forces to establish a set of relative
prices that equate supply with demand in all markets.
In real world capitalist economies, however, investors,
savers, and lenders make expenditure commitments
and enter into debt contracts the profitability of which
depends on the future course of relative prices. There
is no full set of futures markets in which 'right future
prices' can be made known at the time the commitments
have to be made nor can there be. The commitments,
on which growth in a capitalist economy depends,
have to based on guesses. Equilibrating tendencies in
the markets that do exist can be and often are thwarted
by cumulative wrong guesses about implicit supply
and demand relations in non-existent futures markets,
leading to boom/bust patterns of economic growth.
Knowing this, a major part of the entrepreneurial
effort of the capitalist firm is devoted to planning and
implementing strategies to strengthen its power to
influence the future prices and costs relevant for its
profitability: by augmenting its technological and
marketing prowess, by vertical and horizontal integration,
by cartel-like understandings with rival firms, etc.
When its efforts along these lines are inadequate, the
firm is also prone to seek protective governmental
measures. Not only is it impossible to get all essential
prices right because key markets are lacking, but the
search by firms for security by other means results in
market structures and prices that are ridden with
monopoly elements.
The mercantilistic industrialisation policies of Latin
American countries had been premised on the plausible
view that the larger, more experienced firms of the
advanced capitalist countries were superior along the
various dimensions of market power to their incipient
Latin American competitors. The 'wrong prices'
generated by such policies were in part the obverse of
attempts to reduce investor uncertainty by providing
protective controls and subsidies as substitutes for the
non-existent futures markets. The coherence of the
attempts were often undermined by political constraints
and mistakes of judgment, providing monetarists with
easy and often valid targets of attack. But general
liberalisation of commodity and financial markets to
get rid of white elephants is like drenching the
neighbourhood with DDT to kill mosquitos. The
immediate side effects can devastate many other firms
as well, while the longer term heritage can be increased
uncertainty and a depressed investment climate rather
than steady full capacity growth.
Cognisant of the short-term side effects, the Latin
American monetarist programmes did incorporate
In the Arrow-Debreu specification of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for stability of a Walrasian economy with capital accumulation.
money and debt, a complete set of futures markets that produce each
day prices for all tomorrows is one of the essentials.
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various measures to ease the transition of firms to the
new market environment of 'correct' prices. These
variously included phased reductions of import duties,
crawling peg exchange rate adjustments, business tax
cuts, foreign stabilisation loans to help finance the
increased imports and to reduce the strain on domestic
money markets of government debt financing. Monetary
correction, ie, indexing the nominal value of bank
deposits and loans and publicly marketed debt to
changes in the price level, was also adopted to assist
the transformation of the private financial markets
toward 'efficient intermediation' with positive real
interest rates. Above all, a central feature of all the
programmes was an early and drastic fall in real wages
and the wage share of value added.
This last feature was accomplished by exploiting another
ambiguity of the 'get prices right' concept. In Walrasian
theory alternative sets of equilibrium prices are generated
by alternative distributions of income and wealth.
Conversely, changing relative prices alters the
distribution of value added and the relative values of
assets as well as the allocation of economic resources.
The 'wrong prices' to the monetarists included subsidised
prices of basic foods and some public services such as
bus fares that were proportionately much more important
in the budgets of the working class than of the more
affluent families, as well as 'excessive' prices of import
restricted consumables such as motor cars, household
durables and various fineries that were predominantly
consumed by the middle and upper classes.
Operationally, getting prices right' meant bringing the
relative prices of traded goods in line with 'international
relative prices' and eliminating government subsidies
of non-traded public services. This required a relative
price twist that depressed the purchasing power of
wage income while raising that of the high-salaried
and propertied classes. Price level stabilisation required,
in turn, dampening reactive money wage pressures
and wage-price spiralling.
Monetarist stabilisation efforts in the earlier post-war
had foundered on working class reactions and populist
political opposition to such unequalising price twists.
Reviewing that experience then, I wrote'. . . that there
is always some curtailment of the money supply which
will stop inflation. . . lis a] statement.. . equally true in
theory if the word "wages" were substituted for "money",
but in neither form would the advice be very helpful to
the perplexed authorities without some correlative
estimate of the number of machine guns needed. . to
enforce the curtailment' I Felix 1959:584]. In the more
recent monetarist programmes of Brazil, Uruguay,
Chile and Argentina, machine guns, torture chambers
and concentration camps have indeed become standard
practice, along with the purging of unions, outlawing
of strikes, and suppression of populist and leftist
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political movements. A brutal, class-ridden, Marxist
accumulation model lurks behind the aseptic neo-
classical jargon with which Latin American monetarists
discourse on stabilisation policy.
However, increasing the surplus by brute force did not
translate into a sustained increase in the domestic
savings and investment rates. On the contrary, in each
of the four countries both the Gross Domestic Savings
(GDS) and Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) rates
fell after the adoption of monetarism. In Chile and
Uruguay the fall was substantial, and as of 1980
neither rate has rebounded to its 1960s average in the
two countries. The drop was milder in Argentina, but
only in Brazil did the GDS rate in time regain, and the
GDI rate moderately overtake, their respective pre-
coup averages.
Brazil, however, became the partial exception to the
rule only after 1968, when it began bending and
discarding some of its monetarist rules. It retained
monetary correction and wage repression during the
high growth 'miracle' years, 1968-74, but reverted to
the pre-coup strategem of lagging the exchange rate
adjustments behind the inflation rate as a price
dampening device. It abandoned import liberalisation,
heavily subsidised 'non-traditional' exports, and promoted
the expansion rather than the de-nationalising of major
government industrial and financial enterprises. Brazil
was also the only one of the four countries to get on a
fast growth track for a fairly extended period. Its
annual GNP growth during 1968-80, despite deceleration
after 1974, exceeded the pre-coup rate. The other
three countries fell well short of their respective pre-
coup, pre-monetarist GNP growth rates.
Daz7ied by Brazil's fast growth, many outside monetarist
observers were slow to recognise the extent of the
Brazilian policy heresies. Some gave major credit to
Brazil's shift from import substitution to an export
promoting trade strategy, although it was Brazil's
import/GDP ratio, not its export/GDP ratio, that rose
substantially during the post-coup years. Friedman
and his disciples attributed much of Brazil's success to
the indexing of financial liabilities and claims, which
in their view greatly reduced saver and investor
uncertainty and markedly improved the efficiency of
financial intermediation by Brazil's private capital
markets. In fact, indexing favoured the growth of
government banks and corporations, since they, not
private institutions, could assume indexed liabilities
with little risk of insolvency. Indeed, as inflation
accelerated after the OPEC price rise, a ceiling well
below the ongoing inflation rate had to be imposed on
monetary correction to ease the threat of widespread
private sector bankruptcy.
Brazil was the only countly to get on a fast
growth track for a fairly extended period'
Above: h,vdro-electric development in Brazil.
The new development will carry both water
and electric po wer to large undeveloped areas.
Right: part of the equipment in a cement
facto,y; reproduced with kind permission of
the Brazilian Embassy. London,
The leading sectors during the B. azilian miracle'
years were, in order of relative impact, motor cars and
consumer durables, government public utilities and
civil engineering projects, and agri-business. The first
was facilitated by the still modest (by Latin American
standards) domestic diffusion rate of the motor car
and household durables at the time of the coup and
was further stimulated by the post-coup shift of income
distribution to the top quintile of households, who
dominated the effective demand for motor cars and
most durables. Conjunctural luck, namely, the easy
availability during the pre-oil price rise years of long-
term foreign loans at low interest rates that turned into
negative real rates with the rising inflation and dollar
devaluation of the early 1970s, also facilitated the rise
of public sector investment. Yet these fortuitous
conjunctures and the income distribution twist did not
suffice to revive the economy during the first three
years after the coup, when the orthodox monetarism
and trade liberalisation orientation of Economic Minister
Roberto Campos prevailed. It took the mercantilist
heterodoxies of his successor, Delfim Netto, to unleash
the boom. By retaining tariff protection while lagging
the exchange rate (thus keeping prices of the protected
industries wrong' but highly profitable) by rapidly
expanding the pace of government investment with
largely foreign financed fiscal deficits, and by credit
and export subsidies to agri-business, Delfim's heterodox
modifications induced a wave of foreign and domestic
investment in the favoured sectors, which spilled over
to other activities supplying inputs and financial and
marketing services to the driving sectors. The gross
investment rate, though not the domestic savings rate,
rose notably during the miracle' years, with a widening
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balance of payments deficit on current account making
up the difference, while the rate of inflation fell faster
than during the preceding period of monetarist
orthodoxy.
Had Delfim hit upon a viable formula for fast long-
term growth with price stability? Hardly. The oil
intensive, technologically dependent economic structure
which his strategy fostered was particularly vulnerable
to OPEC price rises and changes in the international
financial climate. After 1973 fixed interest loans became
increasingly sparse, just as Brazil's oil import bill was
ballooning from the sharp rise in oil prices. The
double impact of a ballooning oil bill and higher cost
of credit greatly widened Brazil's chronic current
account deficit. Beset by slowing economic growth,
rising inflation, a debt-ridden, financially fragile, private
sector, reawakened working class militancy and rising
middle-class frustration, Delfim's successor teetered
ineffectively between policies of monetary constraint
and monetary stimulus. In 1979 Delfim returned to
office intent on replicating his earlier success; but his
second effort has been a resounding failure. Like
Mohammed Ah, he should have stayed in retirement.
In sum, monetarism cannot be given prime responsibility
for the fact that Brazil's inflation rate now far exceeds
the peak rate of the pre-coup era; but neither does it
deserve prime credit for the boom years preceding the
current breakdown.
Nevertheless, Brazil's miracle years and its success in
attracting foreign direct investment and foreign loans
strongly influenced the expectations of the monetarist
strategists of the other three countries. When their
inflation rates remained recalcitrantly high, their
economies depressed and foreign direct investment
sparse during the early years of their monetarist
programmes, they drew comfort from analogies with
the depressed, inflation-ridden Campos years that
preceded the Brazilian miracle' years, and continued
preparing the ground for the expected economic
upsurge by further liberalising their financial and
commodity markets. In other words, gross under-
estimates of the contributions to the Brazilian 'miracle'
of protectionism, subsidised credit and conjunctural
good fortune sustained their faith.
Of the three countries, only Argentina had a domestic
market for motor cars and consumer durables large
enough to attract substantial multinational investment.
Unfortunately, most of that investment had already
been put in place during the 1960s, and by the mid-
l970s, with replacement and supplemental units rather
than the first time purchases making up the major
share of the market, the profitability of new capacity
appeared distinctly lower than it had in Brazil of the
'miracle' years. Energy price rises, moreover, after the
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initial OPEC rise, darkened the general outlook of the
motor car and consumer durable MNCs, and made
them more cautious than they had been in the 1960s
about expanding in the ldcs. They took advantage of
Martinez de Hoz' progressive import liberalisation,
therefore, to shift some of their sourcing from Argentina
to overseas suppliers and to consolidate Latin American
operations, in some cases by shutting down their
Argentine plants. More generally, the import
liberalisation, which was intended to improve the
overall efficiency of the Argentine industrial sector by
forcing it to compete more directly with imports, did
result in a rise of almost 40 per cent in industrial
output per worker between 1976 and 1980. But this
was associated with a 30 per cent fall in industrial
employment, a mere five per cent increase in output
and a stagnant real volume of industrial investment.
The two main growth sectors during the Martinez de
Hoz era were export agriculture and finance. Until
1979 agriculture benefited from favourable international
prices and an exchange policy which closely linked
the pace of devaluation to the rate of inflation. The
financial sector boomed because of capital market
liberalisation, which was carried much further than in
Brazil. Interest rate ceilings were abolished as were
most restrictions on foreign borrowing by private as
well as public firms. The objective was to raise the
private savings rate, induce the repatriation of flight
capital, and deflect the pressures to accommodate the
demand for credit from the Central Bank to the Euro-
currency markets abroad. A two-tiered credit market
soon formed. Banks, large industrial and commercial
firms with international credit standing, and government
entities borrowed heavily in Euro-currency markets,
the banks then re-lending at sizeable premia over costs
to smaller domestic firms. The oscillating negative
real bank interest rates of the pre-monetarist era,
began oscillating violently and mainly in the positive
quadrant, with real rates reaching peaks of 40-60 per
cent per annum.2 Intensified competition from liberahised
imports and from the large firms with direct access to
cheaper foreign credit drove many smaller firms toward
bankruptcy. Flushed with profits from their credit
arbitraging, a number of private banks collected debt-
weakened firms on the cheap and ballooned into large
financial-industrial and commercial conglomerates.
Increased market concentration, rapidly rising interest
costs, and frequent devaluation more than offset the
dampening effect of falling real wages and import
duties. Inflation stayed in the three-digit range, leading
a frustrated Martinez de Hoz to revert after 1979 to
'The oscillations reflected in part the degree of lag of the exchange
rate behind domestic inflation. Increasing the lag tended to pull down
the short-term real interest rate, but eliminating the lag stimulated the
inflation rate so that the monetary authorities were in a catch-22'
situation ¡ Frenkel 1980:213-481.
the traditional Latino strategem of lagging the exchange
devaluations well behind the inflation rate. That rate
decelerated to lower three-digit figures, but at the cost
of an intensifying profit squeeze on export agriculture
and import-competing industrial firms. Foreign
borrowing to meet cash-flow shortfalls accelerated, as
did the growth of the current account deficit and the
foreign debt. In 1980 some of the leading private
banks and conglomerates were forced into bankruptcy
by rising Euro-currency rates abroad and mounting
loan defaults at home. The spreading financial crisis
set off panic flight from the peso. Central bank reserves
dropped from a peak of almost $12 bn in 1979 to less
than $4 bn by the end of 1980. More rapid devaluation,
reintroduced to staunch the flight, merely accelerated
the inflation rate. By mid-1981 Martinez de Hoz'
hapless successor was confronted with a $30 bn foreign
debt, $1 bn in reserves, inflation approaching 200 per
cent and rapidly declining industrial output and
employment.
The implementing of Chile's monetarist strategy has
differed in three main respects from Argentina's. First,
it has succeeded in cartying through a drastic sell-off
of public enterprises, a feat Martinez de Hoz was
unable to accomplish, primarily because in contrast to
Chile's, the Argentine armed forces have long controlled
and operated a wide, untouchable array of public
sector firms. Second, the removal of unions from
policy influence was more complete in Chile thán in
Argentina, allowing the Chilean Chicago Boys a virtual
free hand to gut social programmes and to privatise
much of the public health, pension and even educational
institutions. All this has enabled the Chilean monetarists
table I
to reduce greatly the public sector's share of GDP and
to eliminate the fiscal deficit by 1979; achievements
which exceeded Martinez de Hoz' grasp. Third, the
Chilean monetarists were able to brush aside industrialist
resistance to import liberalisation and to bring down
import tariffs by 1979 to a maximum rate of 10 per
cent, except for automobiles.
The 'dual' of these accomplishments was a deeper and
more prolonged drop in real output and employment
than in Brazil under Campos or Argentina under
Martinez de Hoz. Not until 1980 did Chile's GDP per
capita rebound almost to the 1972 Allende level. In
1980 the Gross Domestic Investment rate was still
below their respective late 1960s levels, while the
Gross Domestic Savings rate, despite the twist toward
greater income concentration, was far lower. The
unemployment rate was far higher than their 1960s
averages. Despite the opening up of the Chilean
economy and the well-publicised rise of non-traditional
exports, the real value of Chilean exports in 1978 was
10 per cent below that of 1970, although real imports
were 38 per cent higher. Motor cars, household durables,
luxury goods, beverages and clothing, and petroleum
dominated the increase in real imports; imports of
capital goods and industrial intermediates rose negligibly,
despite the decline in competing domestic production
I Ffrench-Davies 1979 j.
The changes in the sectoral shares of output and
employment shown in Table 1 suggest the extent to
which the recovery of GDP was governed by trade
and financial liberalisation. The share of commerce in
GDP as 7.1 per cent higher, and its share of employment
Sectoral shares of GDP and employment in Chile 1970.78
Source: ODEPLAN, Cuentas Nacionales, INE, Encu esta Nacional de Empleo, as cited in Carlos Filgueira. Acerca del consumo
en los nuevos modelos Latinoamericanos' Naciones Unidas, Comision Economica para America Latina, Santiago. 28
May, 1981, E/CEPAL/R.261, mimeo.
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1970
output employment
share share
1978
output employment
share share
per cent change,
1970-78
output employment
L goods sectors
(agriculture,
mining industry,
construction)
.514 .526 .477 .415 7.2 21.1
II. energy and
transportation
.064 .063 .068 .073 +6.2 + 15.9
III. commerce and
services
.422 .411 .452 .508 +7.1 +23.6
23.6 per cent higher in 1978 than in 1970. Conversely,
the output and employment shares of the goods
producing sectors fell 7.2 per cent and 21.1 per cent,
respectively. Getting prices right' pushed the increase
of labour productivity in the goods producing sectors
above the national average, but mainly by depressing
employment more than output. It increased the output
share of commerce and services primarily by raising
the profitability of financial, marketing and importing
activities, but reduced overall output per worker in
commerce and services by swelling the so-called informal
sector' with workers rejected by the goods producing
activities.
As in Argentina, financial liberalisation created a two-
tiered credit market and an explosive growth of
conglomerates. This growth, assisted further by the
selling off of public sector assets at low prices, and the
alienation of small-holdings to agri-business combines
following the revoking of land reform legislation, was
carried much further than in Argentina. In 1978 the
two largest conglomerates (Cruzat and Vial) controlled
half the corporate capital registered on the Chilean
stock exchange. With the demise of Somoza's Nicaraguan
empire, Chile now probably has the highest private
concentration of ownership in Latin America. As in
Argentina, the monetarist strategy also had considerable
difficulty in bringing inflation below three digits. By
1977, however, that feat was accomplished, and by
early 1981 the rate was falling below 30 per cent per
annum, approaching Brazil's 1972 minimum.
Where then is the Achilles heel? Partly it lies in the low
investment rate and flabby productive structure beneath
the glittering facade of ostentatious import-intensive
consumerism and financial wheeling and dealing. Mainly,
it is the rapid increase of foreign indebtedness and the
widening current account deficits that have been
sustaining that façade.
Gross foreign debt more than doubled between 1977
and 1980, equalling 2.3 times export receipts in 1980.
The debt structure has also become more precarious:
its average maturity has declined by about 40 per cent
since 1976. The proportion of the debt consisting of
private liabilities without government guarantee rose
to 55 per cent in 1980 and virtually all of the public and
private debt has been transformed into interest-adjustable
Euro-currency obligations. By 1980 Chile led Latin
America debtor countries in the ratios of debt-service
to exports and debt to GNP.
The rising foreign debt has financed Chile's widening
current account deficit, which in 1978 already averaged
8 per cent of GDP. In 1981, because of rapidly rising
LIBOR rates, falling copper prices and depressed
world markets for Chile's timber based exports, the
deficit is projected by one of Chile's Chicagoid economic
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pundits to rise to 10 or 11 per cent of GDP Fontaine
19811. Recent reports indicate a dramatic increase in
the trade deficit in the first half of 1981.
Chile's Chicago Boys, nevertheless, remain cock-a-
hoop about riding out the storm. In a seminar for
visiting bankers in May 1981, Central Bank presidents
past and present were mobilised to reassure the visitors
that because the rising debt was being incurred by the
private sector it could never be excessive, as it
represented resources that would always be used
productively. Nor was the current account deficit-a
danger, since it was only a reflex of private borrowing
and would fall automatically if the profitability of
private investment declined. Moreover, Central Bank
foreign reserves totalled about 30 per cent of the
foreign debt, which gave ample scope for handling
transitory adjustment problems Ercilla 19811. How
the bankers reacted to this arrantly naive textbook
monetarism is not reported, but we do know that in
1979 Chile had already been placed 40th among 75
debtor countries in degree of country risk lEuromoney
19801.
In fact, Chil&s monetarist strategy has trapped itself in
an impending catch-22' type financial bind. Most of
the peso debt in the two-tiered credit market is indexed
to the exchange rate. Since 1977 the authorities have
been lagging that rate well behind the inflation rate,
and after June 1979 went on to freeze it to the dollar.
This has helped lower the inflation rate and the threat
to the solvency of local firms from massive revaluation
of their peso debt. The obverse side has been an
increasing overvaluation of the exchange rate, estimated
at perhaps 40 per cent in 1981 relative to 1977.
Combined with tariff liberalisation, the exchange policy
has ballooned imports and, by 1980, was imposing a
severe price-cost squeeze on non-traditional exports.
This, however, accounts for only part of the widening
current account deficit, since by 1980 debt servicing
had become the more important factor, as Chile
entered the explosive Ponzi phase of indebtedness, to
use Hyman Minsky's terminology, in which new debt
is required in order to service old debt. The choice
now is essentially how the Government of Chile wants
the financial crisis to come. One way would be to
devalue, the resulting revaluation of the indexed peso
debt setting off a wave of bankruptcies and a financial
panic à la Argentina. A second is to hold the exchange
rate while squeezing hard on the supply of domestic
credit; in effect depressing the activity level in order
to staunch the demand for imports. In this case the
financial panic could come from widespread defaults
on domestic peso loans and from their negative feedback
on the ability of the conglomerates to service their
foreign debt. Finally, the monetary authorities could
try to halt the financial crunch by bailout credits
requiring an upsurge of the money supply. This might
or might not ease the bankruptcy threat, but it could
certainly turn the inflation rate rapidly upward and
destroy the Chicago Boys' main claim to success. As
for Chilean foreign reserves providing an adequate
safety net against any of these eventualities, it should
be noted that the foreign reserves/foreign debt ratio
of Argentina in 1979 was much higher than Chile's in
1981. Capital flight in Latin America can take off with
amazing speed and power.
The theme of this essay resembles the Irish drinking
song: 'Shut the door, they're coming through the
window! Shut the window, they're coming through the
door!' The theoretical flaws of monetarism will eventually
show up in any application. Applied to Latin American
countries with their technological dependence, avid
import-intensive consumerism, gross income inequalities
and weak social cohesion, the flaws magnify in the
execution. This does not mean that given these
characteristics there are easily applicable alternative
strategies for reconciling growth with equity and price
stability. Perhaps the most basic charge against Latin
American monetarism is not failure but moral turpitude.
It is a strategy that exacerbates many of the above
traits, but its recent applicants have been willing to
accept greatly raising the level of brutality and
inhumanity in countries that less than two decades
ago seemed to be outgrowing such behaviour.
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